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Abstract: We develop a conceptual framework in which we show how a non-
executive director’s task performance may change over their life cycle on the 
board. We adopt a three-stage process to examine the task performance of a 
non-executive director: independence stage, engagement stage and relationship 
renewal stage, and use capture theories of regulation to develop a number of 
testable propositions. We argue that capture theory allows us to explain how a 
non-executive director’s task performance can change from one where 
monitoring and control is high and strategy and service is low to the reverse 
over their period on the board. 
 
Keywords: non-executive director task performance; capture theory. 
 
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Farquhar, S., Machold, S. 
and Ahmed, P.K. (xxxx) ‘Theorising director task performance over time: 
insights from capture theory’, Int. J. Business Governance and Ethics, Vol. X, 





Copyright © 200x Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. 
2 S. Farquhar et al. 
 
 
Biographical notes: Stuart Farquhar is a Senior Lecturer in Finance at the 
University of Wolverhampton Business School, where his main teaching areas 
include finance, economics, and corporate governance. He is an editorial board 
member of the International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics. His 
research interests are in board processes, behaviours and board effectiveness, 
and corporate governance in the sports industry. 
 
Silke Machold is a Professor of Corporate Governance at the University of 
Wolverhampton Business School, UK, where she also serves as Co-Director of 
the Management Research Centre. She has chaired the Strategic Interest Group 
on Corporate Governance at the European Academy of Management. Her 
research interests are in the determinants of board effectiveness, board diversity 
and the interface between governance and CSR. She teaches and consults on 
these topics in the UK and overseas. 
 
Pervaiz K. Ahmed is a Professor of Management at Monash University Sunway 
Campus, Malaysia. He is discipline Head of Management, the Director of the 
Strategy Research Group. He has published extensively in international 
journals. He has been a keynote speaker at international venues and won 
numerous academic awards for his research. He is the Founding Editor of the 
European Journal of Innovation Management, the International Journal of 
Management Concepts and Philosophy, International Journal of Business 
Ethics and Governance and International Journal of Management Practice. He 
has extensive experience working with and advising blue chip companies, 
public sector organisations and government agencies in Europe and Asia, such 
as Unilever, Ford, AT&T, the NHS, Malaysia Airlines and the Singapore 
National Productivity Council. 
 
This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled ‘The behaviour 
of the non-executive director: a framework for exploring changes in their role 





Board of director effectiveness is a topic that has attracted considerable attention from 
academics, board practitioners, regulators, and the public in general, fuelled by repeated 
corporate failures. Research on board effectiveness has progressed from the traditional 
approach that studied how board composition proxies for monitoring and control 
(proportion of non-executive directors and CEO chair duality) or resource provision 
(board interlocks) affected firm performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 2003; 
Johnson et al., 2004). More recent attention has been directed at studying actual board 
behaviour and explaining how board processes, such as conflict, effort norms, trust and 
the use of knowledge and skills have affected board tasks, including control and 
monitoring, resource provision, strategy, advice and networking (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999; Huse, 2005; Machold and Farquhar, 2013; Minichilli et al., 2009, 2012; Ruigrok  
et al., 2006; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Van Ees et al., 2008; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Zona and Zattoni, 2007). However, one limitation of these studies is that they have 
largely used the board as their unit of analysis as opposed to the individual director. 
Accordingly, researchers have identified the need to study boards at an individual 
director level to enhance our understanding of the antecedents of board effectiveness 
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(Hambrick et al., 2008; Hillman et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2005), and scholars have 
started to empirically test individual directors’ task performance (Veltrop et al., 2012). 
We agree that such research is necessary to have a fuller understanding of the antecedents 
of board effectiveness (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). However, studies of both board and 
directors task performance have to recognise that the degree of involvement in tasks is 
neither static nor homogeneous. In recent findings from a longitudinal study, Machold 
and Farquhar (2013) for example show that board task performance varies over time 
depending on boards’ sensitivity to environmental and firm-specific contingencies. Thus 
to better understand processual dimensions of task performance a dynamic framework of 
analysis is required to extend the content-focused, cross-sectional approach typically 
adopted in the board composition and board process literatures. 
In order to examine individual directors’ contribution to board effectiveness, Hillman 
et al., (2008) developed a framework that models how individual directors’ multiple 
identities affect their ability to carry out their monitoring and resource provision tasks. 
This multiple identity approach has considerable potential in helping our understanding 
of antecedents of board effectiveness, however the framework does not explain how 
director identities may change through their life cycle on the board. Theories of economic 
regulation, such as capture theory, life-cycle theory, interest group theory and other 
similar regulatory capture theories posit that regulators become captured by the firms and 
industries that they are regulating (Bernstein, 1955; Peltzman, 1976; Posner, 1974; 
Stigler, 1971). Whilst Hillman et al. (2008) contend that directors’ multiple identities 
affect their ability to carry out their monitoring and resource provision tasks, in this paper 
we use capture theories of regulation to provide a framework to explain how directors’ 
identities may be captured and changed throughout their tenure on a board, along with the 
subsequent effects of such capture on directors’ task performance. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a dynamic framework in which to examine how 
non-executive directors’ behaviours and task involvement may change over time. 
Theories of economic regulation (Bernstein, 1955; Peltzman, 1976; Posner, 1974; Stigler, 
1971) suggest that initially regulators take on monopoly firms and attempt to control 
price rises and other practices that are deemed to be against the consumer interest. 
However, according to Posner (1974) and Stigler (1971), over time the regulated firms 
have the power to capture the regulators so that the regulators act in the interest of firms. 
In carrying out their governance role, non-executive directors may be viewed as the 
equivalent of regulators. Given this analogy, capture theories can provide unique and 
relevant insights into how non-executive director identities and task performance change 
through their life cycle on the board. 
In this paper, we extend the use of economic theories of regulation to examine the 
dynamics of individual director behaviour. Specifically, this framework examines how 
non-executive director identities may be captured over time, which in turn affects the 
salience of the non-executive’s task performance. In sum, we seek to contribute to the 
literature on boards by advancing an alternative theoretical perspective that extends 
knowledge on individual directors task performance in an evolutionary tradition 
(Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). The rest of this paper follows in four sections. The first 
section outlines the background to the paper and details why an alternative framework to 
examining non-executive behaviours and task performance is necessary. The second 
section provides an overview of economic theories of regulation. The third section will 
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utilise these regulation theories to provide a framework for future empirical research on 





Interest in corporate governance and the activities of the board of directors has risen 
substantially over the past four decades since the empirical work of Mace (1971) who 
contended that boards were largely rubber-stamps for senior management’s decisions. 
The wider public interest has largely resulted from a series of worldwide financial 
scandals over the past ten to fifteen years (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, Royal Bank 
of Scotland). This increasing attention has also been replicated in academic research in 
corporate governance with a vast amount of literature on boards of directors, and 
especially the role of non-executives, emerging during this period (Daily et al., 2003; 
Hambrick et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2005; Westphal and Zajac, 2013). Whilst this 
research has shown that many boards are far more active than Mace (1971) suggested 
(Hendry and Kiel, 2004), recurring corporate scandals and the recent financial crisis have 
heightened both investors and the general public’s concerns with boards of directors. 
These concerns have led to calls for greater regulation and the development of corporate 
governance codes across the globe (e.g., the United Kingdom’s Combined Code, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, or the King Report in South Africa). 
A common feature of these codes globally is their emphasis on the importance of 
non-executive directors to board effectiveness (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazzurra, 2009; 
Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). As ‘outsiders’ to the firm and its top management team, non-
executive directors are essential to ‘good’ board governance by virtue of their ability to 
provide resources and by exercising control over management (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003). Since uncontrolled managerial excesses and/or malfeasance were often seen to be 
the root cause of corporate scandals, governance codes were developed to guard against 
such failures by recommending not only an increased presence of non-executives on 
boards in general and key committees in particular (e.g., audit, remuneration), but also by 
strengthening processes related to director appointment and development (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2012). In essence, corporate governance codes globally promulgate 
what Johanson and Ostergren (2010) called a ‘board independence norm’ central to 
which is the non-executive director who without fear or favour exercises oversight. 
However, evidence from many of the companies involved in financial scandals led 
scholars to question the extent to which placing such an important ‘regulatory’ task in the 
hand of non-executive directors is actually working (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). 
Companies beset by scandals, including Enron, WorldCom, or Royal Bank of Scotland, 
all had boards with a majority of non-executive directors. Empirical research on the 
effects of board independence is also equivocal (Bhagat and Black, 2001). This raises 
two interesting questions. The first is why, given the evidence of the failures of non-
executive directors to control the economic activities of these companies, do corporate 
governance codes place such importance to their role. The second question, and the one 
we are interested in this paper, is when and why might non-executive directors fail in 
their oversight duties. This question may usefully be addressed using capture theories of 
regulation (Posner, 1974; Stigler, 1971). The following section will provide an overview 
of these capture theories of regulation. 
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3 Theories of economic regulation 
 
Theories of economic regulation have been developed to explain government intervention 
in the economy. Posner (1974) usefully suggested that the term economic regulation 
refers to implicit or explicit legislative and administrative controls over various aspects of 
economic activity. Examples of economic regulation include controls over privatised 
utilities, the level of the minimum wage, occupational licenses, such as lawyers, 
accountants and doctors. Two primary theories that explain the need for economic 
regulation are public interest theory and capture theory. Public interest theory maintains 
that the government generates regulation in order to protect the public from unacceptable 
levels of potential harm (Posner, 1971; Roberts and Kurtenbach, 1998; Stigler, 1971). 
Alternatively, capture theory holds that politically effective groups acquire regulation and 
regulation is formulated in their interest (Posner, 1971, 1974; Stigler, 1971). The basic 
ideas of capture theory can be seen in a number of similar theories, including life-cycle 
theory (Bernstein, 1955), interest group theory (Peltzman, 1976), and predatory capture 
theory (Becker, 1986; Peltzman, 1984). All these theories in some way posit the notion 
that dominant interest groups capture regulation or regulators. Given that a board of 
directors typically consists of two groups, the executive and the non-executive, the 
application of capture theory may be useful in explaining the behaviour of these different 
types of director and how their involvement in board tasks may change over time. 
Capture theory, developed primarily through a set of case studies, suggests that 
regulated groups are able to control or ‘capture’ the agencies that regulate them 
(Bernstein, 1955; Stigler, 1971). According to Stigler (1971), regulation is acquired by an 
industry and designed and operated primarily for its benefit. Assuming that the political 
system and process are rational, Stigler (1971), using a cost-benefit approach, 
demonstrated that there are potential gains for an industry in demanding regulation. 
Through influencing political decisions, powerful industry groups or firms are able to 
influence the nature of the regulation and reduce the costs of the regulation to the 
industry. Using evidence from US regulatory commissions to support his argument, 
Stigler (1971) contended that powerful firms and industries divert regulators to their own 
purposes. In a further development of this general idea, Posner (1974) suggested that 
regulation is supplied to interest groups who provide benefits, such as votes and political 
funding, to elected politicians. The term ‘capture’ is used to describe the range of 
economic theories of regulation where interest groups are thought to be able to capture 
government’s powers for private gain (Bernstein, 1955; Posner, 1974; Peltzman, 1976). 
The underlying notion of capture theory is the interest group theory of the state and 
this was extended by Peltzman (1976) who argued that whilst capture by producer 
interests is not inevitable, the regulator is the fulcrum upon which contending interests 
seek to exert leverage [Peltzman, (1976), 212]. Bernstein’s (1955) life-cycle theory of 
regulation shares a similar conception of an agency pressured by external factions, 
dependent on public support to avoid regulatory capture. Bernstein (1955) contended that 
the creation of a regulatory agency is characterised by a struggle between a diffuse 
majority favouring regulation, the public, and a powerful minority resisting regulation, 
the regulated group. Once the regulation is in place and an agency is created, the public 
loses interest, content in the knowledge that the threat to the ‘public interest’ has been 
averted. In contrast, the regulated group maintains interest, because it has a more specific 
stake in the outcomes from regulation. Consequently, when faced with concerted group 
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action, the regulatory agency over time changes from defending the public interest to 
defending the regulatory group. Bernstein’s (1955) life-cycle theory clearly posits the 
view that regulatory agencies become captured by those group interests to whom they 
were originally set up to control. 
A number of studies of professional regulation found evidence that capture led to 
increases in the prices charged and the incomes earned by affected professional groups 
(Benham, 1972; Benham and Benham, 1975; Shepard, 1978). However, capture was not 
found to exist in all studies (Peltzman, 1976, 1984; Becker, 1986). This led to the 
development of a predatory capture theory (Peltzman, 1976, 1984). Predatory capture 
theory adds to capture models by recognising that regulatory agencies will not serve a 
single economic interest. Peltzman (1976, 1984) argues that interest groups’ demand for 
regulation may conflict and force them to compete for favourable regulation. In a 
refinement of Peltzman’s interest group theory of predatory capture, Becker (1986) 
includes the public as a competing interest group. According to Becker (1986), the 
calculus of decisions regarding regulation involves balancing the interests of competing 
groups in order to optimise politicians’ chances for re-election. Findings in a study by 
Roberts and Kurtenbach (1998) on state regulation and professional accounting 
educational reforms in the USA provide empirical support for predatory capture theory. 
Their results indicated that differences in levels of professional regulation across states 
could be explained by the strength of the economic interests and demands from the 
accounting profession, relative to competing interest groups. 
These capture-based theories of economic regulation suggest that regulators 
behaviours change through time and alter from being pro-consumer to being pro-firm or 
industry. The next section will develop a framework using capture theories of regulation 
to explore how the task performance of non-executive directors may change over their 
time on the board. 
 
 
4 A dynamic framework to explore changes in non-executive directors’ 
task performance over time 
 
Capture theories of regulation were developed to explain the behaviours of independent 
industry regulatory bodies. These independent bodies were established through 
legislation that gives the regulatory bodies responsibility for the oversight of specific 
industries. In carrying out their duties, the regulatory body acts both as an independent 
monitor of the behaviours of the firms within the industry and as an advisor to the firms 
through ongoing discussions. Such a dual role paradox is similar to that of a non-
executive director in a boardroom context (Sundaramurphy and Lewis, 2003; Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003). In carrying out their independent monitoring and control, service and 
strategy tasks non-executive directors may be viewed as analogous to the role of 
regulators as both monitor and advisor. As identified by Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2009) and Zattoni and Cuomo (2010), many worldwide codes of corporate governance 
highlight the importance for the need for independent non-executive directors to act as 
both monitors of and advisors to the board. Given this analogy, we suggest that capture 
theories can help our understanding of how non-executive director identities (either 
monitor, advisor or both) and associated task performance change through their life cycle 
on the board. 
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Our framework has two dimensions – the time that the non-executive director has 
served on the board (x-axis), and the degree of involvement in monitoring and control, 
and strategy and service tasks respectively (y-axis) – see Figure 1. From the time of 
appointment of the non-executive director to the board, we propose that he/she traverses 
through three distinct stages each of which is characterised by a task performance profile 
shaped by the degree of ‘capture’. 
 
Figure 1 Non-executive director task performance over time (see online version for colours) 
 
 
In stage 1, the newly appointed non-executive directors identify themselves with the 
shareholders (Hillman et al., 2008) and are largely independent of the executives. Agency 
theorists propose that the board’s fiduciary duty is to shareholders and this will motivate 
non-executive directors to act on behalf of shareholders (Jensen, 1993). Having received 
their mandate from shareholders, the non-executive directors will initially be inclined to 
act as a controller of shareholders’ interest. Moreover, a number of countries’ legal 
requirements of directors and codes of corporate governance highlight the important 
fiduciary duty of a non-executive director (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Zattoni 
and Cuomo, 2010). Thus, as a newly appointed board member the non-executive director 
is likely to be conditioned to identify him/herself with the shareholders. In this 
Independent stage, the non-executive directors thus demonstrate independence from the 
CEO and protect shareholders’ interests through stringent monitoring and control of the 
management. 
Whilst resource dependency theorists suggest that non-executive directors are 
important providers of advice and counsel, such advice and counsel is going to require 
the development of personal relationships based on trust and respect (Ruigrok et al., 
2006; Westphal, 1999). Such relationships are not likely to develop in the short-term; 
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rather they are conditioned by complex social interactions unfolding over time (Westphal 
and Zajac, 2013). In addition, it will take time and sustained interaction with other board 
members for the non-executive directors to obtain the detailed knowledge of the 
organisation necessary for them to contribute to strategy development (Machold et al., 
2011). Consequently, in the early stages on the board the non-executive director is likely 
to be limited to their monitoring and control task. 
Proposition 1 In the early stage of their tenure on the board, the independence stage, 
the non-executive director’s control and monitoring task performance 
will be high, whilst their strategy and service task performance will be 
low. 
Once the regulation is in place and an agency is created, the public loses interest, content 
in the knowledge that the threat to the ‘public interest’ has been averted (Bernstein, 
1955). In contrast, the regulated group maintains interest, because it has a more specific 
stake in the outcomes from regulation. With an increased proportion of independent, 
outside directors, shareholders’ interests are defended through stringent monitoring of 
management. However, similar to Bernstein’s proposition regarding the public’s loss of 
interest, once the shareholders appear content that the board is now acting in their 
interest, they lower their active concern. As Hart (1995) observed, monitoring has the 
characteristics of a public good: if one shareholder’s monitoring leads to improved 
company performance, all shareholders benefit [Hart, (1995), p.681]. As monitoring is 
likely to be costly, both financially and in time, Hart (1995) suggests that each 
shareholder is likely to free-ride in the expectation that other shareholders will do the 
monitoring. This is likely to mean that no, or virtually no, monitoring will take place. 
Consequently, as we elaborate later this is likely to mean that, over time, the non-
executive directors change from defending shareholders interests to defending 
management interest. Thus, in stage two, the non-executive directors become engaged 
with the organisation and the executive, their director starts to identify themselves less 
with the shareholders and more with the executives and the organisation. In this 
Engagement stage, the CEO begins to capture the non-executive directors. 
Analysing the potential costs facing non-executive directors, who continue to 
demonstrate independence from management, we can identify why the CEO is able to 
capture the non-executive directors. Westphal and Khanna (2003), using survey data 
from a sample of directors and CEOs at Forbes 500 companies, found that directors who 
participate in governance changes that threaten managerial interests experience a higher 
level of social distancing on other boards, particularly when they have low to medium 
status in the corporate elite. Furthermore, directors are less likely to participate in such 
changes if they have recently experienced social distancing. 
The potential costs facing non-executive directors can be influenced by a variety of 
factors in addition to those resulting from the social distancing identified above. 
Literature taking a social psychology and social network perspective (Gulati and 
Westphal, 1999; Johnson et al., 1993; Westphal, 1998, 1999; Westphal and Khanna, 
2003) provides some helpful insights into the development of this argument. The first 
factor relates to non-executive directors appointed during the current CEO’s term. Whilst 
recognising that they must act in the shareholders interests initially, after a period of time 
they might consider that their appointment had been partly due to the CEO. This could 
leave them feeling some obligation to shift their support to the CEO and management 
(Johnson et al., 1993; Westphal, 1999). Secondly, over time, non-executive directors are 
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likely to develop relationships with other board members, including the executive and the 
CEO. This may be through specific tactics by the CEO to ingratiate him/herself with the 
new independent board members (Westphal, 1998), or through actions by the non-
executives to develop trust on the board (McKnight et al., 1998). Once these personal 
ties are developed, breakdowns in the relationships are likely to be at some cost to the 
non-executives. Again, borrowing from the terminology of Hillman et al. (2008), the 
non-executive directors’ identification with the executives and the organisation is likely 
to increase over time as their engagement with the senior management in the boardroom 
becomes more sustained. Stronger identification with the CEO and executive board 
members is likely to lead to greater empathy with management (Hillman et al., 2008) 
and leaves non-executives more open to capture by the CEO. This can have a number of 
effects. Non-executive directors will become less likely to criticise management, 
undertake less stringent oversight of senior management and have lower incentives to 
monitor (Hillman et al., 2008; Westphal and Kanna, 2003; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). In 
addition, identification with the CEO is likely to enhance the willingness of non-
executive directors to make better use of their social capital and offer support and advice 
to the CEO (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Westphal and 
Zajac, 2013). This provision of advice and counsel is helped by the greater trust built up 
through the working relationship during the engagement stage (Westphal, 1999). 
Finally, during the engagement period non-executive’s identity may be shaped by 
concerns for a second term in office. Corporate governance codes typically stipulate an 
initial term of office subject to annual approval at the company annual general meeting, 
with the possibility of a second term. If we assume that the non-executive director wishes 
to undertake a second term, then application of predatory interest theory might be useful 
to explain their potential conflicts of interest. Predatory capture theorists contend that 
interest groups’ demand for regulation may conflict and force them to compete for 
favourable regulation (Becker, 1986; Peltzman, 1976, 1984). According to Becker 
(1986), the calculus of decisions regarding regulation involves balancing the interests of 
competing groups in order to optimise the regulators’ chances for re-election. In this 
illustration, the non-executive director can be seen as weighing up the competing interest 
groups of shareholders and management. During this stage, the non-executive’s identity 
with the CEO and executives is likely to increase, as they perceive them to be important 
for their re-election to the board. Whilst the costs to the non-executive (or indeed the 
CEO) as a result of removal by the shareholders at the company annual general meeting 
is likely to be significant, it will require action by the shareholders who, as Hart (1995) 
suggests, are unlikely to take an active interest unless there is serious concern regarding 
the company’s financial position. This suggests that whereas the potential costs of 
removal are significant, the risk of removal is relatively low as long as the company 
financial performance is improving from the previous period. Reinforcing this, the non-
executive director is likely to consider the CEO as important to his/her chance of a 
second period on the board. Following this logic, the non-executive director is likely to 
view the costs of defending shareholders’ interests as being lower than the costs of 
defending management interests. Consequently, the intensity of their capture by the CEO 
is likely to increase, as they get closer to the time of re-election. 
Proposition 2  After the non-executive director has been on the board for period of   
time, the engagement stage, the CEO will start to capture the non-
executive director and the non-executive director’s control and 
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monitoring task performance will decline, whilst their service and 
strategy task performance will increase. 
After re-election to the board for a second term, we enter the stage 3 process, the 
relationship renewal stage. Here, the non-executive directors are likely to perceive their 
ties to the CEO and the executive as being increasingly important factors in enhancing 
their marketability as directors for other companies. Thus, maintaining a position of 
independence from management may be at some cost to their reputation for the service 
role that resource dependency theorists, such as Hillman et al. (2000) suggest non-
executive directors provide. A reputation for opposing management in a situation where 
CEOs have extensive social network ties is likely to reduce future benefits and by 
implication raises costs for non-executives. CEOs of other firms are unlikely to want 
directors who are constantly challenging and opposing the management position on their 
boards. Consequently, non-executives wishing to enhance their opportunities for future 
directorships are likely to be fully captured by the CEO. 
The non-executive director will identify himself or herself with the CEO and the 
executives and identification with shareholders’ will become very low. In examining how 
regulators’ behaviour changes over time, Bernstein (1955) suggests that the dominant 
interest group will fully capture the regulator. In addition, Posner (1974) suggests that 
regulation is supplied to the interest groups who provide benefits to the regulator. Using 
the analogy of the non-executive director as the regulator, board interlock research 
suggests CEO-board cooperation is an important factor in non-executives being able to 
extend their network relationships and enhance their prospects for future directorships 
(Gulati and Westphal, 1999; Mizruchi, 1996; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994). Through their 
social networks, CEOs can influence other CEOs perceptions regarding the 
trustworthiness of non-executives. Future job prospects for non-executives are likely to 
depend on their reputation in supporting management interests as well as the financial 
performance of the firm. Support for this argument can be found from sociological 
perspectives on boards of directors. Researchers in this tradition have long argued that 
boards are a locus of social control, protecting the ruling managerial elite (Palmer and 
Barber, 2001; Useem, 1982). To the extent that these can be seen as benefits for the non-
executive director, then they are likely to enhance non-executive capture, and strengthen 
the position of the CEO. 
Proposition 3 In stage 3, the relationship renewal stage, the non-executive director 
will become fully captured by the CEO and thus their control and 
monitoring task performance will be very low, whilst their strategy and 
service task performance will be very high. 
 
 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
 
Scholars have identified a number of tasks board members undertake and how board 
processes and behaviours influence task performance, but less is known about how task 
performance changes over time. Equally, most studies have examined board level 
processes and board task performance, but there is a dearth of studies regarding the 
factors influencing individual director task performance, and how directors’ identities 
may shape their involvement in tasks (Hillman et al., 2008). We have developed a 
theoretical framework that provides a more dynamic insight into board behaviours and 
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non-executive director task performance. This framework uses capture theories of 
economic regulation to develop a number of propositions relating to changes in a non-
executive director’s task performance over time. We contend that we can divide a non-
executive director’s time on the board into three stages, the independence stage, the 
engagement stage, and the relationship renewal stage. Through this three-stage process 
we develop propositions that help to provide new insights into how non-executive 
directors’ involvement in, and attitude towards their control and monitoring task, and 
service and strategy task, can change as they develop relationships with the CEO and 
other executives on the board over time. 
The theoretical arguments we advance here contribute to existing literature in several 
ways. First, whilst Shen (2003) uses an evolutionary perspective to explore changes in 
CEO behaviour over their period of tenure, this paper argues that it would also be useful 
to examine how the behaviour of non-executive directors changes over time. In this 
respect, our approach is similar to Shen (2003) in recognising the dynamic nature of 
boards and director behaviour. The recognition of board dynamics develops from the 
attention paid by researchers to board behaviour and process (Huse, 2005; Minichilli et 
al., 2009, 2012; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Van Ees et al., 2008; 
Zona and Zattoni, 2007) and the socially situated nature of directors’ behaviour and 
attendant performance (Westphal and Zajac, 2013). 
Second, we partly borrow from Hillman et al. (2008) in arguing that the task 
performance of a non-executive director varies with the director identity and 
identification with differing stakeholder groups in the firm, primarily shareholders, the 
CEO and executives, and the organisation. However, we add to the literature by arguing 
that non-executive identities may change over their period on the board and specifically 
that they increasingly identify themselves with the CEO and executives, and decreasingly 
with shareholders. 
Third, our framework uses the individual non-executive director as its unit of 
analysis. The majority of previous studies on task performance use the board as the unit 
of analysis rather than the individual director. We agree with Veltrop et al. (2012) that it 
is important to have a greater understanding of the factors that influence the individual 
director’s performance as part of the board. 
Fourth, we contribute to understanding board behaviours by advocating the need to 
examine the changing attitudes to control and monitoring that the non executive(s) might 
adopt and the differing ability of the non-executive to contribute to strategy and provide 
service to the executive over time. To our knowledge, there have been no studies utilising 
theories of economic regulation to understand attitudes and behaviours of non-executive 
directors. We propose that a non-executive director’s task performance changes through 
their life cycle on the board. We suggest that initially a non-executive director takes an 
active role in monitoring the CEO and the executive, and thus control and monitoring 
task performance is high. However, over time the non-executive director’s active role 
changes from control and monitoring the executive to one of provision of strategy and 
service. We argue that this is due to capture by the CEO, which alters the relative costs 
and benefits of a non-executive director in undertaking their control and monitoring task 
relative to their strategy and service tasks. In the early stages of their period on the board, 
the benefits of rigorous monitoring of the CEO considerably outweigh the costs of 
monitoring, with the consequential effect of reducing the time and effort spent on their 
strategy and service task. As the non-executive remains on the board for a period of time, 
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we suggest that the cost-benefit equation from active monitoring alters. In this case, the 
cost of monitoring increases relative to the benefits, with a resultant reduction in the 
amount of time and effort spent on control and monitoring compared to that spent on 
strategy and service. 
Fifth, we use arguments from social psychology theory and social network theory to 
explain the reasons why a non-executive director may be liable to capture by the CEO. 
The relationship between the CEO and a non-executive director is rightly regarded as 
being of the utmost importance to the effective workings of any board and our paper 
attempts to explain the dynamics of this relationship. 
Sixth and finally, the framework we propose might help further the understanding of 
the reasons for the lack of equivocal empirical support for the relationship between board 
composition and structure and firm performance (Lynall et al., 2003). The dynamics of 
the relationship between the CEO and the non-executive directors, where the former 
might capture the latter, provides a possible explanation why board structure is less 
important then agency theorists advocate. Equally, notions of director capture are 
important to understanding how individual director task performance may change over 
time. The outcome of capture resulting in lower levels of monitoring and control task 
performance and higher levels of strategy and service task performance. Our theorising 
thus provides an economic rationale for understanding why most non-executive director 
dominated boards are not the vigilant monitors that the requirements of corporate 
governance codes require or the public expects. 
A practical implication that can be drawn from our theoretical insights is the 
suggestion that regulators should consider whether non-executive directors should have a 
limited time period on the board if they are to fulfil their requirements laid down in 
corporate governance codes. Moreover, shareholders may wish to be cognisant of 
potential capture effects when re-appointing directors. However, it must be recognised 
that these arguments are merely a first attempt at providing a better understanding of 
non-executive behaviours over their time on the board. The next step is to empirically 
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